The MP suggests that if somebody knows they will cease to get unemployment benefit then they will indeed get a job. This is of course assuming that those who are unemployed are voluntarily unemployed.
Since the 1980's governments have worked to improve incentives to work through supply-side policies. This has included lowering marginal income tax rates, so that people keep more of what they earn, making working more attractive. Governments have also reduced the real value of unemployment benefits to again make work more attractive relative to unemployment.
The theory is often expressed in terms of 'search costs'. Lowering income tax rates and reducing unemployment benefit makes the cost of 'searching' for new work more costly (in an opportunity cost sense) and so workers will therefore accept a new job more readily, probably one which does not match their ideal job, but it gets them back to work. This would be seen as an increase in economic efficiency.
There are a couple of issues with the MP's proposal. Firstly there is the tricky issue of involuntary unemployment (caused by structural or cyclical factors). The proposal will strand those who genuinely cannot find work. They will most likely have to move on to other benefits because their income is so low, meaning the savings to government will be minimal anyway.
Secondly there is the impact on the distribution of income. The unemployed are, by definition, the lowest income earners and this proposal makes them even worse off. The people who would benefit from the MPs proposed use of money saved would be from the higher income deciles, those with large superannuation savings. The effect on the distribution of income would be to make it more unequal (a higher gini co-efficient).
This story has application to the goals of macroeconomic policy and their conflicting nature (equity vs efficiency). Both IB and VCE students can use this as an example of policy.
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